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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

Defendant-Appellant George Q. Ricks (hereinafter "Ricks") appeals the District Court's
decision dismissing Defendants-Appellees State of Idaho Contractors Board, Idaho Board of
Occupational Licenses and Lawrence Wasden (hereinafter "State Defendants") for failure to
state a claim. Ricks brought suit seeking relief against Idaho's Contractor Registration Act
alleging that the requirement that he provide a social security number as part of his application
violated his rights under Idaho's Religious Freedom Act and his constitutional right to contract. 1
Ricks subsequently amended his complaint to add a claim under the United States Constitution's
Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). State Defendants
sought dismissal in three separate motions on the grounds that (1) the Idaho Free Exercise claim
was already decided by the Idaho Court of Appeal in Lewis v. State Dep 't of Transp., 143 Idaho
418, 146 P.3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006); (2) there is no constitutional right to contract; (3) there is no
First Amendment right to withhold a social security number on religious objection; and (4)
RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the States. State Defendants ask that the District Court's
dismissal be upheld.
II I
Ill
Ill

Ricks also alleged that the statute was void for vagueness, violated the separation of powers,
and violated his right to equal protection. Those claims do not appear to be a part of this appeal.
1
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B.

Statement of the Facts and Allegations

All of the allegations in Ricks' complaint titled Amended Civil Action for Violation of
Constitutional a.'ld Statutory Rights2 (hereinaf-1.er "Amended Complaint:') arise from the Idaho
Bureau of Occupational Licenses' ("IBOL's") alleged refusal to process Ricks' application for
an Individual Contractor Registration because he would not provide his social security number.
(CRA pp. 18-23.) Ricks alleges that on June 14, 2014, he filed his application and omitted his
social security number and that on June 19, 2014, an employee of the IBOL notified him that in
order to process his application, he would need to provide his social security number pursuant to
Idaho Code § 54-5210(a). (CRA p. 19.) Ricks did not provide his social security number and
instead provided an affidavit asserting his religious objection. 3 (See CRA pp. 18-23.) On
August 12, 2014, the IBOL denied Ricks' application for a license. (CRA p. 19.)

In the

Amended Complaint, Ricks alleged that by denying his application for Individual Contractor
Registration, IBOL is in fact denying him free exercise of his religious beliefs and his
fundamental right to contract and to" ... carry on his private business his own way." (CRA p.
23.)

The District Court interpreted the Amended Complaint to include a claim that the

Contractor Registration Act was "void for vagueness as a 'police power' of the State," a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a violation of separation of powers, and a violation of

2 Ricks'

original complaint was filed at the same time as the Amended Complaint. (Clerk's
Record on Appeal ("CRA") pp. 12-23.)
3
Ricks does not allege that he does not have a social security number, but simply that he should
not have to disclose it in order to obtain a contractor's license.
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Federal Privacy Act of 1974. 4 (Id.) Ricks requested compensatory damages for loss of earnings
and all other remedies that the Court deems just under Idaho Code § 73-402 and 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (Id.)

Ricks later amendtXl his complaint to add a claim under the United States

Constitution's Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. (CRA pp. 41-42.)

C.

Course of the Proceedings

Ricks filed his Amended Complaint on August 11, 2016. (CRA pp. 18-23.) State
Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the grounds that 42 U.S.C. § 666
preempts Ricks' religious objections under Idaho state law, which was supported by the court's
decision in Lewis v. State, Dep 't ofTransp., 143 Idaho 418, 146 P.3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006). (CRA
p. 49.) The District Court agreed and dismissed that portion of Ricks' Amended Complaint in a
memorandum decision and order issued on November 15, 2016. (Id.) As noted above, the
District Court did not dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety because it found some
alleged claims that were not addressed in the State's first motion. The State Defendants then
filed a second motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint on November 29, 2016 and a
supporting memorandum on December 7, 2016, on the remaining grounds that providing a social
security number does not violate the "fundamental right" to contract because there is no right to
contract, and that the Idaho Contractor Registration Act is not void for vagueness, a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, a violation of separation of powers, or a violation of the Federal

4

After State Defendants' first motion to dismiss, the District Court only partially dismissed the
Amended Complaint finding that these vaguely stated claims had not been addressed. State
Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss to address these claims, which were eventually
dismissed. These claims do not appear to be a part of this appeal.
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Privacy Act of 1974. (CRA p. 49.) The District Court granted that motion at hearing on
February 2, 2017. (Id.; February 2, 2017 Transcript.)
Prior to that motion being heard, Ricks filed a motion for reconsideration on the
November 15, 2016, decision and a motion to amend his Amended Complaint. (CRA pp. 24-42,
49.) The Court denied the request to reconsider its decision on the first and second motion to
dismiss, but granted Ricks the opportunity to submit a proposed second amended complaint to
add a claim that providing his social security number violated his First Amendment Right. (CRA
p. 49; February 2, 2017 Transcript.) After argument, the Court granted Plaintiff's request and
lodged his second Proposed Amended Complaint 5 ("Second Amended Complaint") on March 6,
2017. (CRA pp. 41-42, 49; February 2, 2017 Transcript.)
On March 20, 2017, State Defendants filed their third motion to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint on the ground that there was no First Amendment right to withhold a social
security number from a contractor registration application. (CRA pp. 48-55.) At oral argument
on May 1, 2017, Ricks clarified that his Second Amended Complaint was also bringing a claim
under RFRA, which was not addressed in the State Defendants' third motion to dismiss because
that claim was not clear from the text of the Second Amended Complaint.
Transcript, 10:12-20, 12:13-17.)

(May 1, 2017

State Defendants sought leave to file a supplemental

memorandum in support of the third motion to dismiss and the Court granted the request and the
hearing was continued to June 8, 201 7. At the hearing on June 8, 2017, the District Court denied
5 Ricks

filed the proposed Second Amended Complaint without briefing on February 10, 2017.
Court deemed the proposed Second Amended Complaint filed as of the date of the hearing
(March 6, 2017 Transcript 13:7-14).
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State Defendants' motion as it related to the RFRA claims and found that RFRA could be used to
challenge a state statute despite the United States Supreme Court's ruling in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). (June 8, 2017 Hearing Transcript 7:11-8:20) ("[T]he state
statute that is applicable and involved in this case exists, if not solely, but at least substantially to
because 42 U.S.C. 666.

The obtaining of a social security number from a contractor is

substantially intertwined with a federal statute and exists in large part to service that federal
statute for child support enforcement. Therefore, if RFRA applies to the federal statute, that
gives life to the state statute, then the State's motion to dismiss cannot be granted.") On July 5,
2017, the District Court issued a memorandum decision and order, granting in part, and denying
in part, State Defendants' third motion to dismiss - dismissing the First Amendment Claims, but
not the RFRA claims. (CRA pp. 68-77.)
On August 16, 2017, Ricks filed the instant appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
Memorandum Decision and Order entered on July 5, 2017. (CRA pp. 78-90.) This action was
dismissed in its entirety on September 1, 2017, after the district court reconsidered its decision
on the RFRA claims. (CRA p. 95.) Ricks' notice of appeal listed issues far narrower than his
opening brief. (CRA p. 79.)
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Ricks has phrased the issues on appeal as follows:
1. "42 Did the U.S. Congress intend to infringe on the People's liberty to contract or
their free exercise ofreligion in enacting 42 U.S.C. 666?"

2. "Is the Liberty to contract an inalienable right that can only be denied by due process
oflaw?"
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3. "Does the requirement of a SSN in order to register as a contractor violate [his] free
exercise of religion?"
3.a. "Did Congress intend to preempt [his] free exercise of religion under Idaho's Free
Exercise of Religion Act. (FERA)?"
3.b. "Does LC. 54-5210(a) in direct connection with LC. 73-122 comply with Federal
law?"
4. "Is LC. 73-122 discriminatory toward those who have a religious objection to
providing a SSN in order to register as a contractor?"
State Defendants rephrase these issues on appeal as follows:
1. Whether "the freedom to contract" is a constitutional right protected under the due
process clause.
2. Whether the State Defendants are properly named parties as they relate to the
constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 666.
3. Whether LC. § 54-2110's requirement that a contractor submit a social security
number violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
4. Whether this Court should reconsider the decision in Lewis v. State Dep't ofTransp.,
143 Idaho 418, 146 P.3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006).
5. Whether LC. § 73-122 is discriminatory by failing to include a religious exemption
for individuals who have a social security number and for religious reasons do not
want to provide that social security number.
For clarity of argument, these issues will be addressed below in an order different than
that listed above.

III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Idaho Contractor Registration Act requires an individual to submit a social security
number as part of one's application. I.C. § 54-5210(a). This requirement is based in Federal
law, 42 U.S.C. § 666, which is part of the Federal Welfare Reform Act and implements
enforcement for child support enforcement. It is contained in subchapter IV, which is entitled
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"Grants to States For Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children and For Child Welfare
Services."

This federal law to collect social security numbers for all occupational and

professional licenses is enacted under the Spending Clause and States - like Idaho - can opt to
accept federal welfare money in exchange for complying with the law.

See 42 U.S.C. §

666(a)(13)(A). Idaho has done so, which is why the Idaho Contractor Registration Act requires
that all applicants provide a social security number.
Because the Idaho Contractor Registration Act is based on federal law, the Idaho Court of
Appeals found that by accepting federal dollars, Idaho is bound by the federal law, and that law
(42 U.S.C. § 666) preempts Idaho's Religious Freedom Act. Ricks has provided no authority for
why that decision should be reversed. However, even if he had, Idaho and the federal courts
have long held that there is no religious right to not comply with non-discriminatory general laws
on the grounds of a religious objection.
Finally, to the extent that Ricks is making some form of challenge to the constitutionality
of 42 U.S.C. § 666, 42 U.S.C. § 666 is constitutionally sound and State Defendants are not
among those officials with authority to enforce that statute. There is no inalienable right to
contract under the First Amendment as the freedom to contract is qualified and not absolute. The
at-issue statute here has a proper legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.
Further, the statutory requirement that applicants provide a social security number is wholly
neutral in religious terms and uniformly applicable. Appellant was and is required to provide his
social security number is order to obtain a contractor's license.
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Therefore, the State Defendants ask the Court to uphold the dismissal of Ricks' claims in
their entirety.
IV.

ST At~DARD OF REVIE\-V

The standard of review in reviewing a district court's order granting a motion to dismiss
is the same as that used in summary judgment. McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 188 P.3d 896
(2008)(quoting Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 751-52, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216-17 (2006)).
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as
the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." lnfanger v.
City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1101-02 (2002)(citation omitted). "All

disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving
party." Id. at 47. "Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. "If
there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court
exercises free review." Id.
V.

ARGUMENT

A. The Court Should Uphold the Decision in Lewis v. State Dep Jt of Tramp. Because
That Decision Correctly Found That Idaho's Religious Freedom Statute was
Preempted by Federal Law

This case is and always has been a challenge to the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in
Lewis v. State Dep 't. of Transp., 143 Idaho 418, 146 P.3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006). In Lewis, the
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court analyzed whether the submission of a social security number for purposes of obtaining a
driver's license violated Lewis' rights under Idaho's religious freedom statutes. The court held
that any statutory religious rights in Idal10 were preempted by the federai requirements contained
in 42 U.S.C. § 666. See Id. This Court should not reconsider that decision.
The facts in Lewis are nearly identical to this case with the exception of the type of
license that Plaintiff has applied for. In that case, Lewis failed to provide a social security
number as required by the application to renew his driver's license. Id. at 420. Lewis would not
provide his social security number because "Lewis believes the number issued to him by the
federal government is either the precursor to, or actually is, the biblical 'mark of the beast."' Id.
He claimed that the requirement to submit his social security number violated his state statutory
and constitutional rights under Idaho's Free Exercise of Religion Act, codified at Idaho Code §
73-402.

The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected Lewis' claims without reaching the religious

freedom issue because the submission of a social security number for a driver's license renewal
was a federal requirement that was dictated by federal law.
Although Idaho has declared by statute that "Free exercise of religion is a fundamental
right[,]" it has also declared that an applicant for registration as a contractor shall include on the
application the applicant's "Social security number[.]" I.C. §§ 73-402(1); 54-520l(l)(a). The
requirement to submit one's social security number for a professional or occupational license is
based on a federal requirement for the interstate tracking of child support orders, found at 42
U.S.C. § 666(a)(l3)(A). "The federal statute in question, 42 U.S.C. § 666, is part of the Welfare
Reform Act which requires each state to have effective interstate child support enforcement laws
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and implement those procedures set forth by federal statute." Lewis, 143 Idaho at 422. This
includes the recording of the social security number for anyone applying for "a professional
license, driver's license, occupational license, recreationai iicense, or marriage license[.]" 42
U.S.C. § 666(a)(l3)(A). As was found in Lewis, and should be found in this case, the federal
requirement to record a social security number for a professional or occupational license
preempts Idaho's religious freedom statute where there is a conflict between the two laws. See
Lewis, at 425 ("The state is compelled to follow a federal mandate, and any portion of LC. § 73-

402 that creates a conflict with that mandate is without effect."). This is because Idaho has
consented to be bound by the federal law/procedures by accepting the federal money associated
with this Spending Clause Bill.
Ricks' arguments run directly counter to the Lewis decision, and indeed, provides no
authority or point of error in that decision other than his general disagreement with the result.
However, even if this Court wants to revisit these findings, there is no substantial burden on
religious practice by requiring individuals to comply with state regulatory laws. See Bissett v.
State, 111 Idaho 865, 866-67 (Ct. App. 1986). In Bissett, the court addressed "whether the state

is infringing impermissibly on Bissett's constitutionally protected freedom of religion by
requiring him to possess a driver's license, to register his motor vehicle and display license
plates, and to obtain liability insurance in order to drive in the state[.]" Id. The court found that
Bissett's religious freedoms were "incidentally affected[ed]" and that compliance with the law
would not affect Bissett's underlying beliefs. Id. at 868. Importantly, Bissett was addressed
prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Emp 't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (superseded by
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RFRA). See Bissett at 867 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) and Wisconsin v.

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).

In other words, Bissett was analyzed under the pre-Smith

framework, which is the fra.-nework that Idaho's Religious Freedom Act sought to restore.
SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The Legislature finds that:
(1) The Constitution of the State of Idaho recognizes the free exercise of religion.
(2) Laws that are facially neutral toward religion, as well as laws intended to
interfere with religious exercise, may burden religious exercise.
(3) Governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification.
(4) This state has independent authority to protect the free exercise of religion by
principles that are separate from, complementary to and more expansive than the
first amendment of the United States Constitution.
(5) Under its police power, the Legislature may establish statutory protections that
codify and supplement rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Idaho.
(6) The compelling interest test, as set forth in the federal cases of Wisconsin v.
Yoder, (1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, (1963) is a workable test for
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing government
interests. S.B. 1394, 2000 Leg. Sess. (Idaho 2000).
For that reason, if this Court determines that Idaho's Religious Freedom Act is not preempted by
42 U.S.C. § 666, it is long-standing law in Idaho that neutral regulations with an incidental
burden on religion do not adversely affect an individual's right to freely exercise his/her religion
under Idaho's heightened standard as it applies to religious freedom in Idaho's Religious
Freedom Act.
B. I.C. § 54-2110's Requirement That a Contractor Submit a Social Security Number
Does Not Violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution

The Supreme Court, and several lower courts, have already addressed the issue of
whether the requirement to submit a social security number violates the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause. "The statutory requirement that applicants provide a social security number is
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I.C. § 54-5210(l)(a). There is nothing in this language to demonstrate a discriminatory intent or
animus towards religion.
Idaho Code § 54-5210 was added for the purpose of tracking and preventing
"unscrupulous contractors" from performing work in the state of Idaho. See H.B. 163, 2005 Leg.
Sess., Statement of Purpose (Idaho 2006). It was amended in 2009 to include language specific
to insurance requirements. See H.B. 109, 2009 Leg. Sess. (Idaho 2009). There is nothing in the
language of the statute or the statement of purpose for the original bill or the amendment to
indicate that the Contractor Registration statute is not in relation to a proper legislative purpose
or that it was enacted for an arbitrary or discriminatory purpose.
"Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise
Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every
aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs.'' United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)
(finding that all employers must submit social security taxes even if it burdens religious
practice). There is no violation of the free exercise clause when a state refuses to issue a driver's
license to a person that fails to provide a social security number under religious objection.
Miller, 176 F.3d at 1206. ("We also conclude that Miller's free exercise of religion is not

violated by California's valid and neutral requirement that all applicants for a new or renewed
driver's license provide a social security number.") There is also no violation of free exercise for
citing someone for failure to possess a driver's license, display a license plate, or obtain liability
insurance even if that person refuses to do those things due to religious objection. See Bissett,
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111 Idaho at 866-67. ("[W)e hold that the laws do not unconstitutionally infringe upon Bissett' s
religious practice. Bissett remains subject to the law regardless of his refusal to consent to being
regulated.... Compliance with the law may incidentally affect Bissett's practice of his religion,
but it will not inhibit or alter Bissett's beliefs.")
In fact, as several federal district courts have noted, no case has been successful that has
challenged a neutral law requiring the submission of a social security number as an infringement
of First Amendment freedoms under the First Amendment or the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA").

See Mcilwain v. Comm 'n of Internal Revenue, 2006 WL 2192113, *3 (D.

Oregon 2006) ("Federal Court have seen a number of challenges to the mandatory provision of
social security numbers by individuals who believe that social security numbers are the 'mark of
the beast' or a sin. . .. None of these challenges have been successful."); Hill v. DNA Med.

Staffing, LLC, 2010 WL 2280510, *l (D. Arizona 2010); see also Sutton v. Providence St.
Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1999) (failure to hire due to failure to submit a
social security number under a religious objection does not violate Title VII's religious
protection because it would cause the employer to violate other federal law).
The requirement to provide a social security number in order to register as a contractor
does not violate Ricks' Free Exercise of Religion.
II I
II I
I II
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C. The "freedom to contract" is Not a Constitutional Right Protected Under the
Due Process Clause
Ricks relies upon several cases to claim there is an inalienable right to contract. (Ricks'
Appellant Brief, pp. 10-13.) His authority ultimately does not support such a proposition as there
is no "inalienable right to contact".
In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation
for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and
prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that
deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation. But the
liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection
of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of
the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the
restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,391 (1937). Further, "it was recognized in the cases

cited, as in many others that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There
is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses." Id. at 392. Moreover,
"the right to make contracts is embraced in the conception of liberty as guaranteed by the
Constitution. . .. But it was recognized . . . that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not
absolute right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses."
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. McGuire, 31 S.Ct. 259, 262 (1911); see also
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 512 (1934) ("The Constitution does not guarantee the

unrestricted privilege to engage in a business or to conduct it as one pleases."). The right to
contract must yield to the interests of the public and matters of public concern. Nebbia, 291 U.S.
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at 510 ("Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.") "If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process
are satisfied[.]" Id. at 516. Accordingly, Ricks' authority does not demonstrate that the liberty
to contract is an inalienable right protected by the due process clause. Finally, given the rulings
in McGuire and Parrish, any authority pre-dating these opinions does not support Ricks'
position/argument. 6
There is no inalienable right to contract. The freedom to contract is qualified and not
absolute. Ricks was and is required to provide his social security number is order to obtain a
contractor's license and the requirement that he do so does not violate any "right to contract."

D. The State Defendants Are Not Properly Named Parties as They Relate to the
Constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 666.
Arguments made related to the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 666 are disjointed and
difficult to follow, but it appears that Ricks may be arguing some form of challenge to the
constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 666 under RFRA. 7 (Ricks' Appellant Brief, pp. 9-10.) While
the District Court found that "[Plaintiff] is implicitly challenging 42 U.S.C. 666 as it applies to
that state statute," (see CRA p. 71) State Defendants continue to maintain that Ricks has not

6

Ricks cites to Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City, 111 U.S. 746 (1884); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Morehead v. New York ex rel
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) all which pre-date McGuire and Parrish. (Ricks' Memo., p. 1012.).
7
This is partially derived from the arguments that were made below because it is less than clear
what legal argument or relevance exists in the statement that the statute was not enacted under
the supremacy clause, but was enacted under the spending clause. (Ricks' Appellant Brief, p. 9.)
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asserted a claim challenging the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 666 in either his Amended
Complaint or in his Second Amended Complaint. (See CRA pp. 18-23, 41-42.) Based on the
language of both complaints, t.1-1.is has been and remains a challenge to Idaho Code§ 54-5210(a)
and its requirement that an applicant for a contractor's license submit a social security number
for that license. (Id.) Idaho is a notice pleading state and the District Court's Order interpreting
Plaintiff's complaint to include an "implicit challenge" to 42 U.S.C. § 666 does not put State
Defendants on notice as to what it is they are defending in this action.
But if indeed the application of 42 U.S.C. § 666 to Ricks is being challenged under
RFRA, 8 officials with authority to enforce that statute should be named as defendants. See
I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l ).

Defendants are not among those officials.

RFRA states that the

"[g]overnment shall not ... " and further defines "government" as "branch, department, agency,
instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, or
of a covered entity[.]" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1, -2 (emphasis added).
Within the express language of the statute, none of the named people/entities in this
matter constitutes the "government" for purposes of RFRA because they are Idaho state actors
and not persons acting under color oflaw of the United States, nor has Ricks alleged as such. In
order for the named parties to be considered acting under color of law, Ricks must allege that the
deprivation resulted from a governmental policy "or a rule of conduct imposed by the
government." Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9 th Cir. 1999).

It is well recognized that RFRA does not and cannot apply to state statutes after the United
States Supreme Court's decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).

8
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Additionally, "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to
be a [governmental] actor." Sutton, 192 F.3d at 835. In Sutton, the plaintiff attempted to sue a
private entit)' under P'-F~~ for e11fcrce111ent of federal lav1 - specifically, the requirement that all

employees submit a social security number prior to employment. Id. at 836. The Sutton plaintiff
argued that the private entity was subject to RFRA because federal law compelled the defendant
to collect his social security number.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the

compulsion argument only applies "in cases in which the government itself, not a private entity,
was the defendant." In other words, the Sutton plaintiff did not sue the "government" as it is
defined in RFRA and, therefore, did not state a claim under that statute. The same is true here.
None of the named State Defendants constitutes the "government" for purposes of RFRA's
application, and any claim by Plaintiff so alleging fails.
Finally, to the extent Ricks is challenging 42 U.S.C. § 666's requirement on the basis that
it violates the Tenth Amendment (see reference to SD. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), Ricks'
Appellant Brief, p. 10)), such an argument has already been defeated. Carmichael v. Sebelius,
Civil Action No. 3:13CV129, 2013 WL 5755618 (E.D. Va. Oct. 23, 2013). In Carmichael, the
court noted that the Fourth Circuit had held in a challenge to the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
§§ 651-669) that the Act's "conditions are not so overbearing as to create an unconstitutional
compulsion." Id. at *3. Similarly, the court noted in another challenge to the exact provision
that is at issue here, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(l3), the Western District of Michigan found no
compulsion or coercion exists, stating that "Michigan has a free choice whether to comply with
the requirement that it collect SSNs on drivers' license applications and receive federal funds or
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do not." Id. (citing Mich. Dep 't of State v. United States, 166 F. Supp.2d 118, 1236 (W.D. Mich.
2001). The Carmichael court then granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim regarding a violation of the Tenth Amendment. In this matter, Ricks has cited no law to
refute this authority and his arguments in relation to the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 666 fail.
E. I.C. § 73-122 is Not Discriminatory for Failing to Include a Religious Exemption
for Individuals Who Have a Social Security Number and for Religious Reasons
do Not Want to Provide that Number

Idaho Code Section 73-122 states:
(1) The social security number of an applicant shall be recorded on any
application for a professional, occupational or recreational license.

(2) The requirement that an applicant provide a social security number shall apply
only to applicants who have been assigned a social security number.
(3) An applicant who has not been assigned a social security number shall: (a)
Present written verification from the social security administration that the
applicant has not been assigned a social security number; and (b) Submit a birth
certificate, passport or other documentary evidence issued by an entity other than
a state or the United States; and (c) Submit such proof as the department may
require that the applicant is lawfully present in the United States.
The provision provides no exemption from the recording of a social security number on
professional licenses for individuals who have a religious exemption to providing a social
security number. As a preliminary matter, this claim, allegation, or argument was not raised in
the Amended Complaint, Second Amended Complaint, or in any of the briefing below and
should be dismissed. See Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,
236 (2010) ("[I]ssues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be
considered or reviewed.")
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However, even if this Court would like to address the claim or argument, it appears that
Ricks is attempting to bring an equal protection argument here arguing that he is denied equal
protection of the laws because of his religion. "The Equal Protection Clause commands that no
State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is
essentially a direction that all personas similarly situated should be treated alike." Animal Legal

Def Fund v. Otter, 118 F.Supp.3d 1195, 1209 (D. Idaho 2015).

"Under traditional equal

protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained, if the classification itself is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 1209.
"[I]n order to subject a law to any form of review under the equal protection
guarantee, one must be able to demonstrate that the law classifies persons in some
manner." A law may create a classification in one of three ways: By showing
that the law discriminates on its face; by showing that the law is applied in a
discriminatory fashion; or by showing that the law, although neutral on its face
and applied in accordance with its terms, was enacted with a purpose of
discriminating.

Id., at 1210 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir.
1988)). "A law that neither targets a suspect class nor burdens a fundamental right is subject to
rational basis scrutiny." Latta v. Otter, 19 F.Supp.3d 1054, 1073 (D. Idaho 2014). "The Court in
such cases presumed the law is valid unless the challenger can show the difference in treatment
bears no rational relation to a conceivable government interest." Id. at 1073.
The Idaho Contractor Registration Act does not discriminate on its face; is not applied in
a discriminatory fashion, and there is no indication that it was enacted with a purpose of
discrimination. Therefore, the law does not classify people in a manner that will subject it to
review under an equal protection analysis.
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Ricks now argues it is discriminatory for those individuals who have a religious objection
to providing their social security number and that it is therefore not neutral. (Ricks' Appellant
Brief pp. 16-17.) In support of his arguments, Ricks cites Emp 't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) and Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 694 (1983), but neither case helps his cause. In Smith, and
contrary to Ricks' characterization of the holding, the court declined to extend the prior
balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). More importantly, as noted
above, the court in Bowen specifically held that "[t]he statutory requirement that applicants
provide a Social Security Number is wholly neutral in religious terms and uniformly applicable."
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S at 703.

Bowen specifically cuts against all of Ricks' remaining

arguments. There is no discrimination within Idaho Code§ 54-5210(a) and Idaho Code §73-122
as both are neutral. As such, the District Court correctly determined that Idaho Code § 545210's requirement of providing social security numbers on contractor license applications is a
facially neutral law of general applicability and that that it does not mention religion and applies
to any persons applying for an Idaho contractor's license

VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is requested that this Court uphold the District Court's
decision dismissing this action in its entirety.
I
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I
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